

Set Values for Mean-Field Games

& Set Valued PDEs

Melih İşeri

Advisor: Jianfeng Zhang

USC



Defense on March, 2023

• Set Valued V : (t, x, μ, \dots) parameters \longrightarrow $\{O\}$ collections (instead of elements)

Set Valued
Frameworks

Geometric Surface Evolutions (phase transitions, crystal formations, image processing)

Stochastic Viability & Target Problems

Dynamic Risk Measures

N-player Games

Multivariate Control Problems

Mean-field Games.

Multi-variate Control Problem

$$V(t, x) = \{ J(t, x, \alpha) : \forall \alpha \}$$

- DPP

i.e. time-consistency.

- PDE (HJB)

Mean-Field Games

$$V(t, \mu) = \{ J(t, \mu, \alpha) : \forall \alpha \text{ equilibrium} \}$$

- DPP

- Convergence $(V^N \rightarrow V)$

- PDE (Master Equation)?

Set Valued Calculus

Defn $D \in \mathcal{D}_2^m$ if it is closed and

- $D = \bigcup_{1 \leq k \leq m} D_k$, D_k is C^2 -manifold with dimension k .
- $\exists n_1, \dots, n_{m-k} : D_k \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^m$ basis for normal space & $\partial_{\text{gen}}(y)$ exists.

Defn $\Pi_D(y) \doteq \{ \gamma'(0) \mid \gamma : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow D, \gamma(0) = y \}$ tangent space

$N_D(y) \doteq (\Pi_D(y))^\perp$ normal space




Given $V(x) : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathcal{D}_2^m$; $\mathcal{G}_k \doteq \{ (x, y) : x \in \mathbb{R}^d, y \in V_k(x) \}$ graph of V_k

Continuity $V(x) : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathcal{D}_2^m$ is continuous under d .

$$d(D, \tilde{D}) \doteq \max_k d(D_k, \tilde{D}_k)$$

(Hausdorff) $d(D, \tilde{D}) = \inf \{ \epsilon > 0 : \tilde{D} \subset \mathcal{O}_\epsilon(D) \text{ \& } D \subset \mathcal{O}_\epsilon(\tilde{D}) \}$.



$f : \mathcal{G}_k \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is continuous

if $(x_n, y_n) \in \mathcal{G}_k \rightarrow (x, y) \in \mathcal{G}_k$ then $f(x_n, y_n) \rightarrow f(x, y)$

$$D = \bigcup_{1 \leq k \leq m} D_k$$

D_k is C^2 -manifold with dimension k .



$$G_k = \{(x, y) \mid x \in \mathbb{R}^d, y \in V_k(x)\} \text{ graph of } V_k$$

$V(x) : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{D}_2^m$ is continuous under dl.

$$d(D, \tilde{D}) \doteq \max_k d(D_k, \tilde{D}_k)$$

$f : G_k \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is continuous

if $(x_n, y_n) \in G_k \rightarrow (x, y) \in G_k$ then $f(x_n, y_n) \rightarrow f(x, y)$


Differentiability $V(x) : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{D}_2^m$ is differentiable if $\exists \Phi$ s.t.

$$\Phi^{x_0, y_0}(x_0) = y_0$$


$$\Phi^{x_0, y_0}(x) \in V_k(x) \text{ if } y_0 \in V_k(x_0)$$

$\Phi^{x_0, y_0}(\cdot)$ is differentiable

$$\Phi'_i(x, y) \doteq \partial_{x_i} \Phi^{x, y}(x) \text{ is continuous in } x \text{ Lipschitz in } y.$$



Local Representation



$$n \sim \partial_z \Psi \quad \& \quad \partial_y n \sim \partial_{zz} \Psi$$

Lemma If V differentiable,

then Ψ is differentiable in x & $\partial_z \Psi$ is continuous.

Moreover, \exists continuous basis $n(x, y)$ for each k .

$$\partial_{x_i} V(x, y) \doteq (N \cdot \Phi'_i)(x, y) \text{ independent of } \Phi$$

$$- D = \bigcup_{1 \leq k \leq m} D_k$$

D_k is C^2 -manifold with dimension k .



$$- \mathcal{G}_k = \{(x, y) \mid x \in \mathbb{R}^d, y \in \mathbb{V}_k(x)\} \text{ graph of } \mathbb{V}_k$$


$V(x) : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{D}_k^m$ is continuous under dl.

$$dl(D, \tilde{D}) \doteq \max_k d(D_k, \tilde{D}_k)$$

$f : \mathcal{G}_k \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is continuous

if $(x_n, y_n) \in \mathcal{G}_k \rightarrow (x, y) \in \mathcal{G}_k$ then $f(x_n, y_n) \rightarrow f(x, y)$

Differentiability




$\Phi'_i(x, y) \doteq \partial_{x_i} \Phi^{x_i, y}(x)$ is continuous in x
Lipschitz in y .

$\partial_{x_i} V(x, y) \doteq (N \cdot \Phi'_i)$ independent of Φ

Fundamental Theorem

$$V_t^i = y + \int_0^t \partial_{x_i} V(x + s e_i, V_s^i) ds$$

$$\mathbb{V}_k(x + t e_i) = \left\{ V_t^y : y \in \mathbb{V}_k(x) \right\}$$




Defn $\partial_{x_i} f(x, y) \doteq \partial_s f(x + s e_i, V_s^i)|_{s=0}$

Ex $\partial_{x_i x_i} V(x, y) \doteq \partial_{x_i} (\partial_{x_i} V(x, y))$

Ex ∂_{x^n} plays a role in Itô's Formula.

Remark $\partial_{x_i x_i} V \neq \partial_{x_i x_i} V$

Fundamental Theorem



Defn $\partial_{x_i} f(x,y) \equiv \partial_s f(x + se_i, V_s^i) |_{s=0}$


Ex $\partial_{x_i x_i} V(x,y) \equiv \partial_{x_i} (\partial_{x_i} V(x,y))$

Ex $\partial_{x_i} n$ plays a role in Itô's Formula

Differentiability


$\Phi'_i(x,y) \equiv \partial_{x_i} \Phi^{x,y}(x)$ is continuous in x
Lipschitz in y .

$\partial_{x_i} V(x,y) \equiv (N \cdot \Phi'_i)(x,y)$ independent of Φ




Example 1 $V(x) = a(x) + D$

Trivial Cases




$$\Phi^{x_0, y_0}(x) = y_0 + a(x) - a(x_0)$$

$$\Rightarrow \partial_x V(x,y) = N \cdot \partial_x a(x)$$



Example 2 $V(x) = B(a(x), R(x))$. $\partial_x V = n n^T \partial_x a + n \partial_x R$

Example 3 $V(x) = \left\{ [1 + x \cos(1/x + m\theta)] (\cos\theta, \sin\theta) : \forall \theta \right\}$




- continuous
- not differentiable
- n is not continuous.

Itô's Formula

$$V_t^y = y + \int_0^t \partial_t V + \frac{1}{2} \partial_{xx} V + K^E ds + \int_0^t \partial_x V + \zeta dB_s$$

$$V_k(t, B_t) = \left\{ V_t^y : y \in V_k(0,0) \right\}$$



$$\begin{array}{c} K^E \\ \swarrow \quad \searrow \\ \partial_x n \quad \partial_y n \end{array}$$

MCP | MFG

- DPP
- Convergence
- PDE

Ito's Formula

$$V_t^y = y + \int_0^t \partial_t V + \frac{1}{2} \partial_{xx} V + K^E ds + \int_0^t \partial_x V + \xi dB_s$$

$$V_k(t, B_t) = \{ V_t^y : y \in V_k(0,0) \}$$



Multivariate Control Setting

Dynamics

$$X_s^{t,x,\alpha} = x + \int_t^s b(r, X_r, \alpha_r) dr + \int_t^s \sigma(r, X_r, \alpha_r) dB_r$$

Value

$$Y_s^{t,x,\alpha} = g(X_T^{t,x,\alpha}) + \int_s^T F(r, X_r, \alpha_r, Y_r, Z_r) dr - \int_s^T Z_r^{t,x,\alpha} dB_r \in \mathbb{R}^m$$


Set Value

$$V(t,x) = \{ J(t,x,\alpha) : \forall \alpha \}; \quad J(t,x,\alpha) \doteq Y_t^{t,x,\alpha}$$


DPP

$$V(0,x) = \{ J(0,x,\alpha; T_0, \phi) : \forall \alpha, \phi \in \mathcal{V}(T_0, X_{T_0}^\alpha) \}$$


$$\text{Recall: } V(0,x) = \sup_\alpha E [V(T_0, X_{T_0}^\alpha) + \int_0^{T_0} F \dots]$$



m=1




m > 1




Set Value

$$V(t, x) = \{ J(t, x, \alpha) : \forall \alpha \}$$

$m=1$



$m > 1$



HJB

$$\sup_{a, \xi} n \cdot \left[\partial_t V + \frac{1}{2} \partial_{xx} V + K^\xi + F \right] (t, x, y, a) = 0 \quad \forall (t, x, y) \in G$$

Theorem

(i) Suppose $V \in C^{1,2}$. Then V solves HJB equation.


(ii) Suppose $\tilde{V} \in C^{1,2}$ solves HJB and optimal I^*, ξ^* exists. Then $V = \tilde{V}$.

Moreover, $y \in \mathbb{V}_b(t, x)$ and $y = Y_t^{t,x,\alpha^*} \Rightarrow Y_s^{t,x,\alpha^*} \in \mathbb{V}_b(s, X_s^*)$


Theorem (i) Suppose $V \in C^{1,2}$. Then V solves PDE equation.

(ii) Suppose $\tilde{V} \in C^{1,2}$ solves PDE and optimal I^* , φ^* exists. Then $V = \tilde{V}$.


Moreover, $y_t \in \mathbb{V}_b(t, X_t)$ and $y_t = Y_t^{t, X_t, \alpha^*} \Rightarrow Y_s^{t, X_t, \alpha^*} \in \mathbb{V}_b(s, X_s^*)$



[Application] Moving Scalarization



Mean-Field Games



Population

$$X_s^{t, \mu, \alpha} = X_t + \int_t^s b(r, X_r^{t, \mu, \alpha}, \mathcal{L}_{X_r^{t, \mu, \alpha}}, \alpha(r, X_r^-, \mathcal{L}_{X_r^-})) dr + B_{t,s}$$

Player

$$X_s^{x, \alpha} = x + \int_t^s b(r, X_r^{x, \alpha}, \mathcal{L}_{X_r^{x, \alpha}}, \alpha(r, X_r^-, \mathcal{L}_{X_r^-})) dr + B_{t,s}$$

Nash Equilibrium

$$\mathcal{J}(\underbrace{t, \mu}_{\text{population}}; \underbrace{\alpha^*, x}_{\text{player}}) \geq \mathcal{J}(t, \mu, \alpha^*; \alpha, x)$$

$$\forall (t, \mu) \doteq \left\{ \mathcal{J}(t, \mu, \alpha^*; \alpha^*, \cdot) \mid \alpha^* \text{ equilibrium at } (t, \mu) \right\}.$$

Games are sensitive ..

MFQ

<u>population</u>	$\alpha \in A$	$\mathcal{J}(\alpha^*; \alpha^*) \geq \mathcal{J}(\alpha^*, \alpha)$	α^* equilibrium
<u>player</u>	$\tilde{\alpha} \in A$		

Relaxed

<u> </u>	$\gamma \in \mathcal{P}(A)$	$\mathcal{J}(\gamma^*; \gamma^*) \geq \mathcal{J}(\gamma^*, \gamma)$	γ^* equilibrium
<u> </u>	$\tilde{\gamma} \in \mathcal{P}(A)$		

Global

<u> </u>	$\Gamma \in \mathcal{P}(\alpha)$	$\mathcal{J}(\Gamma; \alpha) \geq \mathcal{J}(\Gamma; \tilde{\alpha})$	Γ equilibrium $\alpha \in \text{supp } \Gamma$
<u> </u>	$\alpha \in A$		

• $\forall \neq \forall^{\text{Relaxed}} = \forall^{\text{Global}}$ •

Games are sensitive..

[Dynamics are state dependent]

but..

state-dependent $\propto (t, X_t, M_t)$

path-dependent $\propto (t, X_{[0,t]}, M_{[0,t]})$

full-information $\propto (t, X^1, \dots, X^N)$

• $\mathbb{V}^{\text{state}} \neq \mathbb{V}^{\text{path}}$ •

— weak MFE

Stability

ϵ -equilibrium

$$\int_{\mathbb{R}^d} \mathcal{J}(t, \mu, \alpha^*, \alpha^*, x) - \inf_{\alpha} \mathcal{J}(t, \mu, \alpha^*, \alpha, x) d\mu(x) \leq \epsilon$$

$\forall_{\epsilon}(t, \mu) \doteq \{ \varphi \text{ Lipschitz:}$

$$\int_{\mathbb{R}^d} |\varphi - \mathcal{J}(t, \mu, \alpha^*, \alpha^*, \cdot)| d\mu(x) \leq \epsilon; \quad \alpha^* \text{ } \epsilon\text{-equilibrium at } (t, \mu) \}$$

$$\forall(t, \mu) \doteq \bigcap_{\epsilon > 0} \forall_{\epsilon}(t, \mu)$$

Results

Diffusion: state: homogeneous

discrete: state / path: homogeneous / heterogeneous

$$\underline{\text{DPP}} \quad \mathbb{V}(0, \mu) = \left\{ \mathcal{I}(t, \mu, \alpha^*; \alpha^*, \cdot; T_0, \varphi) : \alpha^* \text{ equilibrium}; \varphi \in \mathbb{V}(T_0, \mu_{T_0}^{\alpha^*}) \right\}$$

- Under monotonicity (uniqueness) + $\mathbb{I} \hat{t} \Rightarrow$ Master Equation

Convergence

$$\bigcap_{\epsilon > 0} \limsup_{N \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{V}_\epsilon^{N, \text{hom}}(t, \vec{x}) = \mathbb{V}(t, \mu) = \bigcap_{\epsilon > 0} \mathbb{V}_\epsilon(t, \mu) \quad (\alpha_1 = \dots = \alpha_N)$$

$$\bigcap_{\epsilon > 0} \limsup_{N \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{V}_\epsilon^{N, \text{het}}(t, \vec{x}) = \mathbb{V}^{\text{global}}(t, \mu) = \mathbb{V}^{\text{relax}}(t, \mu) \quad (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_N)$$

Thank

YOU